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PREFACE
Public policy in the American states has attracted 
the attention of an increasing number of political scientists 
in recent times. Many and varied kinds of studies have been 
done to determine the relationships between factors in the 
political environments of American states and the content 
of the public policies of these states. The results of these 
studies vary as do the studies themselves. More often than 
not, the findings contradict each other.
One such contradiction is observed in the findings of 
studies on the relationship between economic and political 
factors within the political environment and state public 
policy. Some studies identify economic factors as the major 
determinants of state public policy while others claim that 
political factors play the major role in determining public 
policy.
I observed an environmental factor that has not been 
given sufficient attention in many of these controversial 
studies. Many researchers have not seriously considered 
political culture as a possible prominent influence in the 
makinq of state public policy. The stimulus from this 
discovery coupled with the curiosity to find out what lies 
behind that of which little is known, impelled me to embark 
upon this study that uses the path analytic technique and
ii
hypothesizes that political culture, vis-a-vis wealth and 
political participation, makes the greatest impact on the 
welfare policies of the states in the plains and southeastern 
regions of America.
It was found that when the direct and indirect impacts 
of independent variables (political culture, wealth, and 
political participation) upon the dependent variable (welfare) 
are taken into account, none of these impacts equals that of 
political culture. Subsidiary hypotheses also show that 
states with moralistic subcultures pay higher welfare 
benefits than states with traditionalistic subcultures, and 
that the difference in the amount of welfare benefits does 
not stem primarily from differences in wealth.
Although the methodology employed in this study is open 
to further refinement, it has shown the need to develop and 
test causal relationships in the study of public policy in 
American states.
I express my gratitude to Dr. James Johnson who gave 
much of his time to encourage and direct me during this study 
and to Professor Orville Menard and Dr. Phil Secret for their 
invaluable advice and corrections. I also thank my wife, 
my mother-in-law, and my two sons for patiently enduring some 
of the inconveniences which my devotion to this study brought 
upon them,
iii
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INTRODUCTION
Thucydides speaking through the lips of Pericles once
said:
We are a free democracy . . . We do not allow
absorption in our own affairs to interfere with 
participation in the city's. We regard the man 
who holds aloof from public affairs as useless? we 
yield to none in independence of spirit and complete 
self reliance.1
The above statement evokes two thoughts regarding 
politics. For one thing, politics, the art of making 
scarce resources or values go around, has had a long history. 
Secondly, the political culture of the Athenians, implicit 
in the statement, dictated that every Athenian be a 
practicing politician. Although direct democracy does 
not obtain in America today, or anywhere else for that 
matter, the fact still remains that the political culture of 
a people, an element of their general culture, influences 
their political system and practice.
The concept of political culture was a latent given in 
ancient political thought. Political scientists have long 
accepted such concepts as collective will, social contract, 
constitutional concensus, and inherent values as concepts
^Edith Hamilton, The Echo of Greece (New York:
W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1957), pT 30.
1
2that "bespeak of a basic and implicit force in human 
2
societies." It is the discovery of the concept of
political culture that has shed some light upon this "latent
3coherence m  political life." Besides shedding some light
on consistency in political life, political culture could
explain, to some extent, the processes of a particular
political system. It becomes necessary, therefore, that the
study of political culture be not merely descriptive but
theoretically relevant and specific as to its application.
Lucian Pye implied that such specificity of application
served the useful purpose of making particular systems more
understandable when he said,
If studies of political culture were to converge 
more with respect to key themes, then it would be 
easier to judge the extent to which particular 
studies have successfully added to our capacity to 
understand particular systems.4
This thesis with its focus on political culture will
converge on a specific theme. It seeks to explore the
influence political culture, vis-a-vis other environmental
factors (wealth and political participation), has upon the
2
Lucian Pye, "Culture and Political Science: Problems
in the Evaluation of the Concept of Political Culture," in 
Louis Schneider and Charles M. Bonjean, eds., The Idea of 
Culture in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 19 73) , p~. 7 6 .
3Ibid.
Ibid., p. 75.
3content of the welfare policies of the states in two U. S. 
regions. It is hoped that such a limited use of political 
culture will add to our understanding of political life in 
the states under investigation and especially to our 
understanding of the impact of culture upon public policy.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Anthropological Concept of Culture
The word culture, in its anthropological meaning, was
established in the English language in 1871 by Edward Tylor
who borrowed the term from the German word, Kulture, meaning
cultivation or becoming cultured, which first appeared in a
5German dictionary m  179 3. But the ethnographic and 
scientific uses of the word today are no longer restricted 
to the idea of cultivation, but extends, instead, to the 
idea of a condition that transcends human beings and in 
which all human societies share, even though marked
g
differences exist among particular cultures.
Tylor does not claim originality to this modern 
usage of culture. The meaning is traced back to his mentor, 
Gustav E. Klemm, who ascribed it to Voltaire. We find an 
early hint of political culture in Voltaire’s observation 
of culture "as it manifested in customs, in beliefs, and
7
in forms of government."
5 w 'A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture: A
Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (New York:
Vintage Books, 1963), pp. 11, 13.
^Ibid., p. 14.
7Ibid.
4
5The academic concept of culture originated, therefore,
from anthropology where it forms a kind of pivot upon which
the discipline revolves. A. L. Kroeber gives the impression
that culture is what makes the anthropologist what he is
when he says that:
. . . the anthropologist . . . .  if he wishes to
remain such, has necessarily to concern himself 
first of all with that aspect and product of 
human behavior— and reinfluence upon it— which is 
usually called "culture".**
Almost as many definitions of culture exist as there
are anthropologists, suggesting how elusive the concept is.
Some scholars see culture as that human behavior which
distinguishes humans from animals. Others use it
synonymously with civilization, in an ethnographic sense,
to mean that which embodies "knowledge, belief, art, morals,
law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired
9
by man as a member of society."
Besides Tylor's inclusive or general view of culture, 
there is a pluralistic and relativistic view. This view 
sees culture as that mode of expressing thoughts and 
actions which is peculiar to a group of people and which
8A. L. Kroeber, The Nature of Culture (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 104.
9
Edward B. Tylor, Primitive Culture: Researches Into
the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language,
Art and Custom (New York: Parento's, 1924), p. 1.
6sets their lifestyle apart from that of other groups of
i 10people.
A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn have examined a
total of one hundred and sixty four definitions of culture
within the discipline of anthropology and have come up
with a definition they felt would satisfy various social
science disciplines. In their words:
Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, 
of, and for behavior acquired and transmitted by 
symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement 
of human groups, including their embodiments in 
artifacts: the essential core of culture consists
of traditional (i.e. historically derived and 
selected) ideas and especially their attached values; 
culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered 
as products of action, on the other as conditioning 
elements of further action.H
It is hard to say whether the above tortuous definition
of culture takes care of the problem of a cacophony of
definitions and explanations. Bronislaw Malinowski has also
added his voice to the debate over the meaning of culture.
He suggests that defining or analysing culture from a
utilitarian or functional and organizational or institutional
stand-point will help anthropology lay a scientific
foundation for an empirical and theoretical study of culture.
By a functional aspect of culture he means the place of
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences/ 
1968 ed., s.v. "Cultural Anthropology" by David G. 
Mandelbaum.
"^Kroeber and Kluckhohn, p. 357.
7culture in enabling human beings to satisfy or meet their
organic or basic needs such as "feeding, heating, housing,
12clothing, or protection from cold, wind, and weather."
His concept of organization or institution implies that
human beings bind themselves together, agreeing to obey
some stated norms and to work within their natural and
artificial environment in order to satisfy their desires.
He, however, points out that all cultures are not the same.
Differences exist in cultures and these account for
differences in such things as institutions which, actually,
are means of addressing "some highly specialized need or 
13values." Malinowski's concept is a variant of the 
pluralistic and relativistic view mentioned earlier. The 
implication here is, even though all cultural patterns 
"crystallize around the same foci, " ^  various groups of 
people have cultures that help them meet common human needs 
in different ways.
The ideas gained from the pluralistic and relativistic 
views of culture, particularly the functional and 
institutional aspects, are attractive to the discipline of 
political science. Given a statement such as the following,
12Bronislaw Malinowski, A Scientific Theory of Culture: 
And Other Essays (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1944), pp. 36-40.
■^Ibid. , p . 40 .
14Kroeber and Kluckhohn, p. 349.
8the attraction increases:
All cultures constitute so many somewhat distinct 
answers to essentially the same questions posed 
by human biology and by the generalities of human 
situation . . . Every society's patterns for living
must provide approved and sanctioned ways for 
dealing with such universal circumstances as the 
existence of two sexes; the helplessness of infants; 
the need for satisfaction of the elementary 
biological requirements such as food, warmth, and 
sex; the presence of individuals of different ages 
and of differing physical and other capabilities.-^
The attraction this statement has for the writer does not
lie in its uniqueness (it is after all another way of
expressing what Malinowski said earlier) but in the
elements it contains which read like politics itself.
Political Culture
Political science has always borrowed ideas from other
disciplines, but was slow in incorporating the concept of
culture. The need to study political behavior more closely,
opened the doors of political science to the concept of
culture. Many Americans felt the need to study other
people's cultures for military and political purposes
during World War II, thus hastening the acceptance of
culture into the political science discipline. However,
the concept of political culture was not fully formulated
until about ten years after World War II when Gabriel Almond
16used it for the first time in 1956. His intention was
■^Ibid. , p. 348. 
16Pye, pp. 65-66.
to compare world political systems with the aid of "certain
17sociological and anthropological concepts." He defined a
political system as "a set of interacting roles . . . ,"
a concept he said had an advantage over such concepts as
institutions, organizations, or groups in the sense that "it
is a more inclusive and more open concept." People in a
particular political system have particular patterns of
orientation to political action, constituting what he called
18political culture.
Almond's view of political culture intruded into areas
which political scientists reserved for "attitudes towards
politics," "public opinion," "political ideology," "political
values," "national character," and "national ethos." He
emphasized, though, that political culture did not "coincide
with a given political system or society" and that it was not
19tantamount to the general culture.
Most political scientists borrow their concept of
political culture from Almond. Sidney Verba writing later
defined political culture as "the system of empirical
beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which define the
20situation in which political action takes place." The
17Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," 
Journal of PoliticsT 18 (August 1956):1.
^Ibid. , p. 396.
19Ibid.
20Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in 
Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, ed., Political Culture and 
Political Deve1opment (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1965), p. 513.
10
definition contained in the International Encyclopedia of
Social Sciences, which came still later, stresses the
subjective and psychological aspects of political culture,
observing that it is not the same as the general culture;
it is quite distinct and separate from it.
Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, 
and sentiments which give order and meaning to 
political process and which provide the underlying 
assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the 
political ideals and the operating norms of policy. 
Political culture is thus the manifestation in 
aggregate form of the psychological and subjective 
dimensions of politics.21
The utility of political culture, its value and its
potential are determined, to a large extent, by how political
scientists use it. Some have applied the concept, first to
the individual (a micro analysis) and then to the polity
(a macro analysis). They borrowed this approach from
Freudian psychology which extrapolated from the individual
to the society. Cultural anthropologists have tended also
to stress this Freudian idea, holding that " . . .  the
collective culture and individual personalities mirror 
22each other."
Heinz Eulau spoke against what he called fallacies 
that were creeping into the discipline of political science 
by way of the micro-macro problem. He maintained that the
21International Encyclopedia of Social Science, 1968 
ed., s.v., "Political Culture," by Lucian W. Pye.
22Pye, "Culture and Political Science: Problems in the
Evaluation of the Concept of Political Culture," in Schneider 
and Bonjean (Eds.), pp. 69-70.
11
ultimate units of action which are politically significant
are "groups, associations, organizations, communities,
23states, and other collectivities," even though concrete
political decisions are made by individuals. Eulau favored,
therefore, the concept that gave prominence to macro analysis
over micro analysis. Some political scientists feel that the
way to solve the micro-macro tension is to extend the findings
on the micro level to the macro level by treating individuals
or small units as analogues of the larger group or unit. On
the other hand, others feel that the problem is solved by
attributing to the individual or the small unit that which
holds for the group or the larger unit. Eulau condemns such
analysis as the fallacy of personification. He discourages
its use within the discipline of political science, arguing
that the fallacy gave rise to the grotesque descriptions of
"national character.
Harold Lasswell, like Eulau, rejects the extrapolation
from the micro to the macro levels. He insists that the
collective system is a basic assumption or a given and that
it consists of roles which could reflect the personalities
25of those who assume these roles. What he says, in effect, 
is that political institutions or organs are larger than
23International Encyclopedia of Social Science, 1968 
ed., s.v., "Political Behavior," by Heinz Eulau.
25Harold Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930).
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and distinct from persons who occupy offices within them
and so it would be wrong to extend to the institution or
organ that which is true of the individual. The best
reconciliation of the micro-macro tension is found in the
concept of political socialization. Political scientists
suggest that political socialization helps "political
systems maintain their continuity and individuals learn how
2 6to perform appropriate political roles."
Lucian Pye suggests that political culture be used in
a system oriented way to explain a particular system or
general categories of systems as Almond and Verba did in
2 7The Civic Culture. It is in this system oriented way that 
political culture is used in this thesis in order to explain 
political behavior in the particular systems of selected 
American states.
The Utility of Models 
Before discussing political culture in the context of 
political processes in these states, political process will
2 6Pye, "Culture and Political Science...," pp. 69-70.
27Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: 
Political Attitude and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1963). The theoretical concern 
of Almond and Verba was to explain that democratic stability 
was contingent upon a generalized "civic culture." They 
tested the theory in a sample of five nations— Britain, the 
U.S., Germany, Italy, and Mexico. They found that the "Civic 
Culture" necessary for the stability of Democracy, was more 
prevalent in Britain and the U.S., than in the other 
countries.
13
be explained briefly using David Easton's system analysis
model. Models help us to visualize or conceptualize that
which does not lend itself to an easy comprehension.
According to Thomas Dyef models:
. . . should order and simplify our thinking about 
politics . . . the utility of a model lies in its
ability to simplify political life so that we can 
think about it more clearly and understand the 
relationships which we find in the real world.
Yet, too much simplification may lead to inaccuracies 
in our thinking about r e a l i t y . 2 o
Any model that deserves the name must correspond with
reality; that is, items in it must be relevant to reality
29so that it could verify reality. Paul Meadows agrees
with the observation of the biologist, L. J. Henderson, that
30"all forms of activity manifest themselves" in systems. 
System is said to be the master model and it is expected to 
explain political life better than most other models. These 
are reasons enough for its use in explaining the political 
process that is related to this study.
Every political system— local, state, national or 
international— operates within an environment, usually
2 8Thomas R. Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public: 
Policy Outcomes in the American States (Chicago: Rand
McNally and Co., 1966), pp. 2-3.
29Paul Meadows, "Models, Systems, and Science," 
American Sociological Review 22, No. 1, (February 1975) :4.
14
divided into intrasocietal and extrasocietal environments.
The intrasocietal environment in turn consists of ecological,
biological, social, and personality systems. These could be
subdivided into such systems as cultural, social, economic,
31and demographic systems. The extrasocietal environment,
which consists of the international society or the
suprasociety, is not very germane to this thesis which
investigates the impact of cultural, political, and economic
factors upon the welfare policies of some American states.
In other words, the study is concerned primarily with the
intrasocietal aspect of the political environment which often
influences every stage of the political input-output 
32process.
33According to Easton, the political system, as an 
open system, reacts or responds to factors or influences 
within its environment, otherwise known as environmental 
disturbances. These disturbances are communicated through 
inputs and "withinputs." Inputs consist mainly of supports 
and demands. Supports, as the name implies, consist of 
the actions of people involved in the political process which 
are favorable to those who authoritatively allocate values.
31David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 20-22.
32David R. Berman, State and Local Politics (Boston: 
Holbrook Press, Inc., 1975), p. 4.
33Easton, p. 57.
15
Obeying rules or laws made by those in authority is an 
example of support. Demands, on the other hand, impose 
strains upon the political system and when they become 
excessive, can undermine the ability of the system to 
process its inputs into outputs. "Withinputs" are those 
demands which do not stem from the environment but from 
within the political system itself. A demand to remedy 
the inequality in district representation is an example 
of withinput, because it is inspired from within the 
system.34
The inputs and "withinputs" go through a conversion
process within the political system to yield outputs in the
form of authoritative decisions such as public policies.
Easton is not very clear on what takes place within the
"box," that is, the processes that go on within the
political system. But Richard Dawson and James Robinson
attempt to summarize this phase of the systems model thus:
Process, as activity and interaction between the 
variables and components within system, in turn 
gives rise to the formulation and implementation of 
public policy. Policy in this context is the 
outcome of activity or interaction among external 
conditions, political system, and political 
process.35
34David Easton, "The Analysis of Political Systems," 
in Roy Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, eds. , Comparative 
Politics: Notes and Readings (Homewood: The Dorsey
Press, 1977), p. 98.
35Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, 
"Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare 
Policies in the American States," The Journal of Politics 
2 (May 1963):266.
16
The output or policy is fed back into the environment
where it would either satisfy the demands of a segment of
the public, or be challenged by an unsatisfied portion of
the same public. It is hard to find a policy that commands
a universal acceptance in any political community. The
output could also give rise to new and related demands.
The feedback lets the authorities know the state of affairs
in the system and so helps them to run the system so as to
cope with stress. Any interference with the feedback
hinders the ability of the authorities to take necessary
action if and when it is needed to keep support for the
3 6system at the desirable level.
Items in Easton*s model— input, process, output, and 
feedback— are relevant to this investigation. For example, 
political culture, the primary variable to be tested, is 
believed to have a dynamic influence on the whole gamut 
of the political system of American states; it is suspected 
to regulate input demands and the political interactions 
that go on within the system and to influence the feedback
process by influencing the conversion of outputs into new
. . . 37or modified inputs.
36David Easton, The Political System; An Inquiry into 
the State of Political Science (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1953), p. 152.
37Samuel C. Patterson, "The Political Culture of the 
American States," The Journal of Politics 30 (February 
1969):190-191.
17
Elazar's Categorization
A number of policy studies have been done which
implicitly or explicitly used Easton's systems analysis
as a model. The interest in political culture as a
significant variable in such studies has increased, especially
since Elazar produced his seminal work on the political
3 8subcultures of the American states.
Borrowing Almond's conceptualization of political 
culture, Elazar has identified three different subcultures 
within the overall American culture. People within these 
subcultures differ in the way they view, among other 
things, government intervention in the political community 
by Way of initiation and execution of welfare programs.
"The political culture of a given area affects the way 
its citizens and public officials perceive conditions,
39structure institutions, and go about solving problems."
Even though the constitutions of American states "differ
40little from each other," the imprint of their political 
cultures is often found in those areas where they differ.
Some states in the South with the type of political culture 
that favors elitism, make provisions in their constitutions 
that subtly but effectively limit suffrage.
38Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from
the States, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1972),
39_. »Be rman, p . 7.
40John D. Hicks, "The Constitutions of the Northwest 
States," The University Studies of the University of Nebraska
Vol. 23 (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska, 1924) , p"I 32.
18
Elazar believes also that political culture is one of
the three factors that influence political life in the
American states.
. . . three overriding factors appear to be especially 
important in shaping the individual state's political 
structures, electoral behavior, and modes of 
organization for political action. They are political 
culture— the pattern of orientation to political 
action in which each political system is embedded; ^
sectionalism . . .; and the continuing frontier . . . .
Elazar's categorization of subcultures in the American
states is based mainly on ethnic origin and religious
affiliations of the early settlers. The settlement
patterns of the various groups that made up the original
American colonies established the foundation for the three
subcultures Elazar identified. With time, the migratory
patterns of the settlers spread these subcultures as they
appear today, across various areas of the United States.
But the passage of time and what Elazar calls the effect
of "externally generated events" have led to the erosion,
intensification or modification of the cultural patterns,
42"to make each local situation even more complex." This 
probably explains the existence of cultural variation or 
mutations that have made it difficult to find any state 
today that completely represents an ideal cultural type.
41Elazar, pp. 84-85.
42
Ibid., p. 104.
19
Explaining the subcultural patterns of the U.S. in 
terms of the frontier, Elazar identifies the "rural land 
frontier" as the period during which the basic political 
patterns were set as the immigrants moved in three great 
waves, starting at the East coast and ending at the West.
This explanation has a religious element to it also. The 
Puritans, starting from the northern part of the nation, 
headed westward leaving their imprint in the New England 
areas, New York state, northern Pennsylvania, the upper 
part of Ohio, the upper Great Lakes and the upper Mississippi 
Valley. Immigrants from Scandinavia and northern Europe 
who had traditions similar to those of the Puritans joined 
them. Moving westward, they settled in Oregon, Washington, 
California, Utah (as Mormons), Kansas (as Abolitionists), 
Colorado, Montana, and Arizona. Elazar calls the subculture 
these groups developed the "moralistic" subculture.
But groups with different religious and ethnic
background, primarily people "from non-Puritan England" and
the interior parts of Germany, settled in the middle of the
nation, covering areas of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, and Maryland. These groups sought:
. . .  to develop pluralistic societies dedicated to 
individual freedom to pursue private goals, to the 
point of making religion a private matter, an 
unheard-of step at the time.^
43Ibid., p. 109.
20
They moved towards the West, crossing Pennsylvania into the 
central parts of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. They finally 
settled in northern California and populated the areas 
in between, including areas of Nebraska, South Dakota, 
Missouri, Wyoming, and Nevada. Some of the areas the 
pluralistic groups populated had elements of the other 
subcultures, but the subcultures which became dominant in 
these areas is termed the "individualistic" subculture.
Those who settled in the southern states sought the 
kind of opportunity their counterparts just described had. 
The difference between the two groups is that those in the 
North sought their "individual" opportunity in commerce, 
while those in the South concentrated their efforts on a 
plantation-centered agriculture— a kind of feudal system 
with slavery as its base. Elazar calls the subculture that 
developed in the South "traditionalistic." The political 
activity of the community revolved around the new elite-- 
those with landed property whose relationship with the rest 
of the population was in terms of noblesse oblige. The 
slaves were completely excluded from any form of 
participation in the political process.
Elazar observed that the Rocky Mountains— the great 
mountain system of America— helped to diffuse cultural 
patterns because they stood in the way of the East-West 
movement. In some places, the traditionalistic and 
moralistic strains mingled. Another type of synthesis or
21
mixing of subcultures that developed was brought about by
what Elazar calls the urban-industrial frontier, which
produced a group of immigrants from Ireland, Italy, Central
and Eastern Europe, and the Balkans. These immigrants, who
came with a traditionalistic culture, picked :up
individualistic cultural attitudes as they settled the
cities, implying that the urban industrial areas of the
U.S. have predominantly an individualistic subculture.
The American political culture today is, therefore,
made up of mixtures of the moralistic, individualistic,
and traditionalistic subcultures.
. . . each subculture is strongly tied to specific
sections of the country, reflecting the streams and 
currents of migration that have carried people of 
different origins and backgrounds across the 
continent (America) in more or less orderly 
patterns. ^ 4
Elazar's identification of these patterns of dominant
subcultures for each state, and even within it was not
arrived at by empirical means. As Ira Sharkansky points
out, the designations reflect Elazar*s "own judgment,
45disciplined by several years of observation." But his 
judgment and observation regarding the political 
characteristics of the subcultures have been confirmed in a
44Ibid., p. 93.
45Ira Sharkansky, "The Utility of Elazar*s Political 
Culture: A Research Note," Polity 2 (Fall 1969):67-68.
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46number of studies. Elazar1s three main subcultures are
shown in the table on the following page.
Each political subculture possesses political
characteristics peculiar to it and by which its political
perceptions and practices are determined.
In the moralistic political subculture, politics is
seen as a positive endeavor for community improvement.
All members of the community are encouraged to participate
in the political process and the political community
expects a healthy struggle for power and a high standard
47of morality from the occupants of public office. Of 
the three political subcultures, the moralistic subculture 
appears to be the most open even though political
46See Russell Hanson, "Political Culture, Interparty 
Competition and Political Efficacy in the American States," 
Publius (Spring 1980):17-35; Nicholas Lovrich, Byron 
Daynes, and Laura Ginger, "Public Policy and the Effects 
of Historical - Cultural Phenomena: The Case of Indiana,"
Publius (Spring 1980):111-125; Richard A. Joslyn, 
Manifestations of Elazar's Political Subcultures: State
Public Opinion and the Content of Political Campaign 
Advertising," Publius (Spring 1980):37-58; Albert J. Nelson, 
"Political Culture and Women's Representation in Lower State 
Legislative Chambers: 19 71 and 197 7," International Journal 
of Intercultural Relations, 8 (1980):367-377; Susan Welch 
and John G. Peters, "State Political Culture and the Attitudes 
of State Senators Toward Social Economic Welfare and 
Corruption Issue," Publius (Spring 1980):59-67. These 
studies are discussed under "Review of Past Studies."
47Elazar, pp. 96-98.
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Table I
The Distribution of Elazar1s Political 
Subcultures Among American States
Moralistic
Subculture
Traditionalistic
Subculture
Individualistic
Subculture
California Alabama Alaska
Colorado Arizona Connecticut
Idaho Arkansas Delaware
Iowa Florida Hawaii
Kansas Georgia Illinois
Maine Kentucky Indiana
Michigan Louisiana Maryland
Minnesota Mississippi Massachusetts
Montana New Mexico Missouri
New Hampshire North Carolina Nebraska
North Dakota Oklahoma Nevada
Oregon South Carolina New Jersey
South Dakota Tennessee New York
Utah Texas Ohio
Vermont Virginia Pennsylvania
Washington
Wisconsin
West Virginia Rhode Island
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intolerance resulting from religious convictions could at
times create a problem.
A different kind of problem exists in the
traditionalistic political subculture. Real political
power is confined to "a relatively small and self-
perpetuating group drawn from an established elite who often
inherit 'their right1 to govern through family ties and
4 8social position.” Even though people in this political
subculture see government as existing for the good of the
community, they favor a political style that seeks to
maintain the status quo. Those who engage in politics in
this subculture are expected to gain from their participation
but not necessary in monetary terms. Political parties and
political competition do not count for much, a fact that
held true in the Southern states where the traditionalistic
subculture predominantes.
The individualistic political subculture has its
own problem also. Most people in this subculture "believe
that politics is a dirty— if necessary— business, better
left to those who are willing to soil themselves by
49engaging in it." > Two norms exist in this subculture 
with respect to what the public expects from those in 
public office. The higher norm dictates that public office
48Ibid., p. 99.
49Ibid., p . 95.
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holders benefit from their office in return for providing
high quality government services. But the lower norm
expects them to serve themselves and those who help elect
them into office. Corruption among public office holders
in the individualistic political subculture shocks
people only if it is corruption of an extraordinary
dimension. The subculture resembles the traditionalistic
subculture somewhat in the sense of its reluctance to
expand government functions. When it does expand these
functions, it is usually in response to an anticipated quid
pro quo— a reward for the public that elected the official(s)
into office. But unlike the traditionalistic subculture, the
individualistic subculture "encourages the maintenance of
a party system that is competitive, but not overly so,
50in the pursuit of office."
The utility of the concept of culture which culminates
in political culture and particularly in Elazar's subcultural
categorization is measured by the many and varied studies
in politics that employ this concept. Even Elazar himself
feels satisfied to see "the intellectual product of his
formulation and . . . the successful testing of it by
51others." A review of these studies will perhaps justify 
Elazar's reason for feeling satisfied, but more importantly
^Ibid. , p. 88.
51Daniel J. Elazar, "Afterward: Steps in the Study of
American Political Culture," Publius (Spring 1980):127.
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it will provide the next logical step in this 
investigation.
REVIEW OF PAST STUDIES
Students of American state politics have done a
number of comparative studies that "have employed political
culture as an explanatory variable to account for interstate
differences in political structure, electoral behavior, and
52policy outputs."
Sharkansky tested political culture as an independent
variable against twenty three variables grouped into three
categories: (1) political participation, (2) the size and
perquisites of the bureaucracy, and (3) the scope,
magnitude, costs, and innovative character of government 
53programs. His results showed that about two thirds of the
twenty three dependent variables correlated with Elazar1s
scale of political subcultures. The relationships between
political culture and some of the measures of political
participation were strongest and most consistent.
54Brian Fry and Richard Winters, even though their 
study did not deal with political culture directly, concluded
52__ . _Hanson, p. 17.
53Sharkansky, pp. 73-74.
54Brian R. Fry and Richard J. Winters, "The Politics 
of Redistribution," American Political Science Review 64 
(June 1970):508-522.
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that political variables make a stronger impact upon ;
redistributive public policy than socioeconomic variables.
55But Eric Uslaner and Ronald Weber focused attention
on an aspect that is not commonly tested in policy studies.
They assumed that in making policies, policy makers respond
to the preferences of someone. They posited that, after
all, the preferences that make the greatest impact upon
public policies are those of the people who make the
policies. Political culture figures into their study
indirectly. They reasoned that the decision makers would
feel the impact of public opinion which in turn would be
influenced by:
. . . environmental factors such as "political 
culture" (which) are likely to mediate the
impact of public opinion on the party system.
A more liberal political culture should produce 
a legislative setting more hospitable to 
redistributive legislation. Such a setting 
would include a more professionalized legislature 
and a greater degree of intergarty conflict 
within the legislative arena.
5 7Charles Johnson carried out a study that supported 
Elazar*s findings that the American political subcultures
55Eric M. .Uslaner and Ronald E. Weber, "The Politics 
of Redistribution: Toward a Model of the Policy - Making
Process in the American States," American Politics Quarterly 
3, No. 2 (April 1975):130-169.
56Ibid., p. 135.
57Charles Johnson, "Political Culture in American 
States: Elazar*s Formulation Examined," American Journal
of Political Science 20, No. 3 (August 1976):491-509.
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stem from itiigration streams of the early settlers. He
used religious affiliation census figures as "tags" for the
political subcultures and he used these to trace Elazar"s
migration streams. Grouping the states according to the
three subcultures, using discriminant analysis, he found
that his results tallied with Elazar's findings. He then
tested the relationship between political culture and each
of a total of eight state political characteristics.
Controlling for socioeconomic variables, he found that
political culture had a significant relationship with six
of the eight variables.
In a study to test the correlation between Elazar's
political subcultures and state public opinion and the
5 8content of political advertising, Richard Joslyn found 
that the variation of public opinion across the U.S. was 
consistent with Elazar's subcultural patterns. Citizens 
in states with the moralistic subculture tended to 
participate more in the politics of their state and to be 
more open toward government intervention than citizens in 
states with individualistic or traditionalistic subcultures. 
Government intervention as used by Joslyn is akin to the 
measure of government welfare policy, welfare payments, 
used in this thesis.
58Joslyn.
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Political culture was also found to be relevant to
women's representation in lower state legislative houses
59in Albert Nelson's study. His results confirmed that
perceptions of politics or political participation— who
should or should not participate in the political process—
perceptions born out of political subculture are factors
that affect women's representation, since "role expectations
6 0in the larger society have a profound impact on behavior."
Nelson found that women have a greater chance to participate
in politics in the moralistic subculture than in the
individualistic and traditionalistic subcultures.
He warned, however, that the percentage of women's
representation was still low in the U.S. even by the
moralistic subcultural standard. His observation is
supported by David Hill's later findings that "the traditions
and cultures of some states may cause female representation
to lag behind popular support for women's full participation
61in political affairs."
^Nelson.
6 0Ibid., p. 369. Role expectation is a product of 
socialization. It will be remembered that Pye associated 
political socialization with political culture when he 
observed that political socialization has been introduced 
by some political scientists to help ease the micro-macro 
tension encountered in the area of political behavior. See 
Lucian W. Pye, "Culture and Political Science: Problems
in the evaluation of the concept of political culture," 
in Schneider and Bonjean (eds.).
61David Hill, "Political Culture and Female Political 
Representation," The Journal of Politics, 43 (1980):168.
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Most of the past studies mentioned do not deal directly
with the relationship between political culture and public
policy. One thing, however, is clear. Political culture
is a variable that cannot be ignored in policy studies.
Even though many of these studies do not deal expressly
with public policy, by implication their results predict
a relationship between political culture and public policy.
One such study is th&t done by Susan Welch and John Peters.
Among other things, they found that "elites from the
moralistic political culture are more likely to be liberal
6 3on the social and economic welfare issues . . . ."
Another study that implies the relationship between
political culture and public policy demonstrated "how the
study of political culture can be used to improve our
64understanding of policy phenomenon." Nicholas Lovrich 
Byron Daynes, and Laura Ginger, in their study of public 
policy and the effects of historical-cultural phenomenon in 
Indiana counties, found that political culture was a stronger 
predictor of more of the variables than socioeconomic 
status conditions, urban/rural characteristics, and 
political party orientation. But on welfare policies, none 
of the variables including political culture was found to 
demonstrate a significant relationship.
62Welch and Peters.
6.1 mIbid., p. 64.
64Lovrich, Daynes, and Ginger, p. 115.
One study that establishes a clear relationship between
65political culture and public policy is John Harrigan's.
He observed that the wealth of a state is related to its 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) payment.
But he argued that New York, for example, whose AFDC payment 
is eight times more than that of Mississippi is not eight 
times more affluent than that state. He, therefore, 
concluded that affluence does not completely explain the 
difference in the levels of the welfare programs or benefits 
of states. "The political culture of states also helps 
explain the difference in welfare benefits."^  In the 
light of Elazar*s characteristics of the American political 
subcultures, it is no surprise that Harrigan found that the 
states with moralistic subcultures proved to be more liberal 
in their AFDC payments than states with individualistic or 
traditionalistic political subcultures, the latter being 
the least liberal.
Harrigan's study is related to the earlier studies
6 7 6 8of both Valdimer Key and Duane Lockard. Key suggested
65John J. Harrigan, Politics and Policy m  States and 
Communities (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1980), p. 233.
^Ibid. , p. 235.
6 7Valdimer O. Key, Southern Politics: In State and
Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949).
✓
68Duane Lockard, New England State Politics (Princeton 
Princeton University Press^ 19^9).
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that in the Southern states, one factor of political culture,
party system, resulted in lack of party competition, for
the absence of effective participation by the citizenry
eliminated the need for political leaders to compete for
votes. As a result, such redistributive policies as
education, welfare, health, and other social service
expenditures were low. Later Lockard came to a similar
conclusion when he studied the politics of the New England
states (Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and Rhode Island), and discovered that
"the internal structures of the parties within a state can
have the most far-reaching implications for the kind of
69policy orientation of the state government." He 
divided the states into one-party and two-party states, 
suggesting that lack of competition in the one-party states 
explained the reason welfare programs were less generous 
in those states.
70But m  196 3, Richard Dawson and James Robinson
contradicted Key and Lockard by asserting that socioeconomic
factors influenced the content of public policy-more than
71did political factors. Dye, in 1966, supported their view 
in his comprehensive analysis of public policy in the
69Ibid., p. 324*
70Dawson and Robinson, pp. 265-2 89.
American states. He concluded that the competitive states 
were usually more affluent than the noncompetitive states and 
so public policy differences between them might not be as 
a result of party competition per se. These past studies, 
their results, and conclusions help create the basis on 
which this study is built.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Rationale for the Study
The Dawson-Robinson and Dye studies are examples of
the many research efforts that have concentrated on the
correlation between the wealth of states and the content
of their public policies. As was observed earlier, these
studies conclude that wealth or affluence and not political
factors is more likely to explain public policy differences
72among the states. Dye and Virginia Gray also stress this
conclusion saying that,
. . . a number of empirical studies had suggested 
that economic development (income, urbanization, 
and industrialization) had a more important impact 
on public policy, including welfare policy, than 
participation or competition.73
Using the path analytic technique, Gary Tompkins has
come up with a finding that tends to contradict the above
conclusions. He developed a causal model, testing it with
74path analysis, which showed no direct path between income
72Dawson and Robinson, also Dye.
73 . . .  .Thomas R. Dye and Virginia Gray, The Determinants of
Public Policy (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1980), p. 11.
74The method of path analysis or path coefficients was 
first used by the geneticist Sewell Wright as early as 1918 
to help him in a quantitative study of genetics. It is a 
causal interpretation of statistical relationships which 
has been extensively used by sociologists since Wright
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and welfare benefit when ethnicity was added to the model. 
Tompkins has, therefore, used "a path analytic model to 
suggest that neither income nor competition-participation 
is as important in determining welfare benefits as 
ethnicity."75
Since Tompkins found ethnicity to be associated with
76a distinctive political culture, and could be used as a
crude measure of culture under certain conditions, and
77since reliable state-by-state measures of political culture
developed it. But recently, political scientists have been 
attracted to its usefulness. Some of them have used it in 
producing more realistic and accurate results of the inter­
actions (direct and indirect) among variables by sorting 
out significant causal sequences. See Otis Dudley Duncan, 
"Path Analysis: Sociological Examples,” in H. M. Blalock,
ed., Causal Models in the Social Sciences (New York: 
Aldine-Arton, 1971), pp. 115-138.
75Dye and Gray, p. 11.
76Gary Tompkins, "A Causal Model of State Welfare 
Expenditure," Journal of Politics 37 (1975):339-400.
77Charles Johnson constructed indices of moralistic, 
individualistic, and traditionalistic political cultures, 
using religious affiliation information derived from census 
data for each state. "Discriminant analysis grouping the 
states according to the three cultural indices produced 
results quite congruent with the classification set forth 
by Elazar." See Charles Johnson's "Political Culture 
in American States: Elazar's Fbrmulation Examined,'Vi
American Journal of Political Science 20 (August 3, 1976):
50 7. Lovrich, Daynes, and Ginger classified the ninety- 
two counties of Indiana into political categories based 
on historical patterns of migration and settlement. They 
tested their categorization with voting behavior in the 
counties and found statistically significant differences 
in voting behavior among the traditionalistic, individualistic 
and moralistic counties. Their finding confirms the utility 
of Elazar's political cultural categorization. The above 
studies attest to the reliability of Elazar's cultural
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are now available, the writer decided to test the relative 
impact of political culture, wealth, and political 
participation on welfare policies of states with different 
political cultures. The investigation is expected to produce 
results similar to those which Tompkins obtained for 
ethnicity. That is, the writer hypothesizes that political 
culture will explain more of the variation in state welfare 
expenditures than will either wealth or political 
participation.
Objective of the Study 
The main objective of this study is to determine the 
relative impact of political culture, political participation 
and wealth upon the welfare policies of the states within the 
Plains and Southeastern regions of America. More 
specifically, the study seeks to confirm the hypothesis 
that political culture as designated by Elazar and modified 
by Sharkansky, makes a greater impact upon the public 
policies of the states in the two regions under investigation 
than the other two variables, using a path analytic technique.
categorization; that is states conform to the pattern 
suggested by Elazar even when their cultures are measured 
by these other criteria considered more objective than 
Elazar1s.
METHODOLOGY
This comparative study goes beyond tracing associations
among independent and dependent variables. It tries to test
7 8the causal linkages of a specific causal model — a four- 
variable causal model.
Hypotheses
Null
Political subculture makes an insignificant impact on 
the welfare policies of the states in the Plains and 
Southeastern regions of the U.S., when compared to the impact 
made by wealth and political participation.
Research
The impact of political subculture on the content of 
welfare policies of the states in the Plains and Southeastern 
regions of the U.S. exceeds that of wealth or political 
participation.
Subsidiary to the main hypothesis are two 
subhypotheses:
Subhypothesis 1 
The states that have moralistic (M) political 
subcultures will likely pay higher welfare benefits than
7 8Dye and Gray, p. 10.
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states with traditionalistic (T) political 
subcultures.
Subhypothesis 2 
Political culture will likely have a greater impact 
on political participation than wealth will.
The main hypothesis and the second subsidiary 
hypothesis derive from the four-variable system mentioned 
earlier, which is discussed further below— see Figure 1.
P
Path of
c ; p
Path of 
w * p
Path 
of 
p- a
Path of 
c- a
Path of 
' w* a
P = Political Participation (voter turnout)
C = Political Culture 
A == Welfare (AFDC)
W = Wealth (per capita income in constant (1972) dollars)
Figure 1. The Hypothetical Path Model of Culture, Wealth 
Participation and Welfare
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The dependent variable is welfare policy while wealth, 
political participation and political cultre are the 
independent variables. The model assumes (as indicated by 
the arrows) that wealth, political participation and political 
culture, each makes a direct impact on welfare. Apart from 
having a direct impact on welfare, wealth and political 
culture make indirect impacts on welfare through their impact 
on political participation.
To obtain the total effects of the impacts of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable it is 
necessary to add together the direct effects and the indirect 
effects as mediated through political participation. The 
direct effects are measured by standardized regression 
coefficients (betas) between each independent variable 
and welfare expenditures. The indirect effects are measured 
by the betas between wealth and culture as independent 
variables and participation treated as a dependent variable. 
Therefore, the effect of political culture is beta c-a +
(beta c-p x beta p-a) and the effect of wealth is beta 
w-a + (beta w-p x beta p-a). (See the hypothetical model 
on p. 39.)
As indicated earlier and as shown above, this study 
does not merely show the association among the variables, 
but reveals the magnitude of these associations. It goes 
still a step further to measure the total effects of these 
variables by taking intervening variables into account
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through the use of the statistical technique of path 
analysis.
Sample
The study uses states as the unit of analysis and
regions as the unit of selection. The regions have been
chosen on the assumption that regions that are far removed
from one another are likely to possess some cultural,
economic, and political differences and therefore, will
provide easier and clearer comparisons. By the same token,
states that are within the same region will likely have more
in common than states in different regions. Sociologists,
economists, planners, and political scientists see regions
as the right units upon which to base the administration
of hhtion^l programs and so have recommended their use for
79this purpose to the federal government. Sharkansky observes 
that,
Regions in America have their peculiarities in 
politics and public policies. Most regions were 
settled by people from a common stream of migration 
who have left their imprint on the politics and 
public policies of such regions.®^
His observation resembles the reasoning behind Elazar1s 
categorization of the political subcultures. The 
distinctiveness of these regions are, therefore, germane to
79Ira Sharkansky, Regionalism In American Politics 
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1970), p. 5.
^^Ibid., pp. 3-4.
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this investigation, which draws its sample of states from
81the Plains and Southeastern regions.
Operational Definition
Political Culture 
The original numerical values assigned to Elazar's
82political subcultures taken as a continuum are as follows:
M MT MI IM I IT TI TM T
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
where the first letter signifies the primary subculture
8 3and the second, the secondary subculture. But Elazar 
assigns numerous separate subcultures to various areas of
81Ibid., pp. 26-27. The Plains region consists of Iowa,
Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and
South Dakota, while Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia make up 
the Southeastern region.
82Elazar, in American Federalism: A View from the
States, p. 117, has no place for MT and the position he gives
TM is after T instead of before T. But he later included MT 
(See Elazar's "Afterward: Steps in the Study of American
Political Culture," pp. 129-130) and endorsed the use of 
a T-M-I continuum rather than an M-I-T continuu, indicating 
a preference for a triangular relationship between political 
subcultures as against a linear one. He said that this 
triangular relationship, a revised form of his former 
circular continuum, "would allow for greater flexibility 
in ordering subcultural responses depending on the issue 
at hand." The writer prefers Sharkansky*s modification 
of Elazar*s numeral values used as an M-I-T continuum to 
Elazar*s T-M-I continuum.
®3Ibid., pp. 106-107.
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84the states of America. He also has another designation
85which he calls the "dominant political culture, by state,"
derived from the numerous separate subcultures. This means
that each state would have two different subcultural values—
one being the mean of the separate subcultures and the other,
the value of the dominant political subculture Elazar assigns
86to each state. Based on Elazar*s numerous intrastate
designations of subcultures, Sharkansky has produced
revised numerical values for the political subcultures
8 7of the forty eight states with which he worked. The 
writer feels that these final numerical values assigned to 
the states lead not only to greater flexibility in the 
empirical study of political subcultures in the U.S., but 
also to greater accuracy. The final scores are shown in 
Appendix D .
Political culture is measured in this study by the 
revised scores which Sharkansky assigned to the American 
states. They are used as interval level variables.
^^Ibid., p. 117.
86Sharkansky, "The Utility of Elazar*s Political 
Gulture: A Research Note," p. 71.
8 7Sharkansky used the formula C = Sum c
n
'Where C stands for the average numerical value to be assigned 
the state’s culture; c equals the value of each cultural 
designation that Elazar assigns to sub-areas within a 
state; and n equals the number of such designations within 
the state." See Sharkansky*s "The Utility of Elazar*s 
Political Culture: A Research Note," p. 71.
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88Political Participation
This is a measure of the role the individual citizens
of the states play in the political process as measured
by the percentage of age-eligible voters who voted in the
89presidential elections in 19 72, 1976, and 1980.
Welfare
It is the public policy of the states toward welfare 
as measured by the average monthly payment per family in 
dollars as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
in 1972, 19 76, and 19 80.
Wealth
The wealth or affluence of the states is measured by 
the per capita income in constant (19 72) dollars for the 
states in 1972, 1976, and 1980.^
Limitations of the Study 
Sharkansky has identified seventeen regions in the
8 8The raw data for political participation, wealth, 
and welfare were extracted from the Statistical Abstract 
of the United States. These data are shown in Appendices A, 
B and C.
89Gubernatorial elections would have constituted an 
ideal measure of voter turnout. But some states elect their 
officials in off-year elections and so are robbed of the 
special stimulus which the presidential election years 
generate. This unequal stimulus would produce a voter 
turnout based upon gubernatorial elections that are not 
comparable for all the states. See Tompkin's "A Causal 
Model of State Welfare Expenditures," p. 398.
90The per capita income in constant (19 72) dollars 
for 19 76 was obtained by dividing the 19 76 per capita income 
in current dollars by implicit price index for 1972 (1*321).
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91U.S., a departure from the six regions commonly used m
most social science literature. Sharkansky*s classification,
however, appears superior as it takes care of the problem
of border states and includes geographically contiguous
states in the same region because regions are supposed to
share similar "historical experiences and contemporary
92characteristics." The result is a finer classification 
of the states which better brings out variations among the 
states and regions and so helps in determining the politics 
and policies of the states with greater clarity. This 
clarity, according to Sharkansky, is enhanced when variables 
are tested in all of the seventeen classifications.
The writer considers it cumbersome to test the variables 
in all of the states in the seventeen regions of the U.S.
This thesis is limited, therefore, to the states in only 
two of the regions— the Plains and Southeastern regions of 
the U.S.— derived from the larger groupings of the North 
Central and Southern regions respectively. Because the 
study is restricted to two regions that are not 
representative samples, (they do not even include the 
individualistic subculture) the results cannot be generalized 
to all the states in the U.S.
91 . . .  . .Sharkansky, Regionalism m  American Politics,
pp. 3-4.
^Ibid. , p. 18.
DATA ANALYSIS, RESULTS, AND DISCUSSION
An examination of the raw data (see Appendix) shows 
that the wealth and AFDC payments of all the states increase 
with time. Judging from Sharkansky1s subcultural values, all 
the states in the Southeastern region are traditionalistic 
and all the states in the Plains region are moralistic 
except Missouri which is traditionalistic. Sharkansky lists 
Missouri as a border state under the Southern region which 
may explain its traditionalistic subculture. The 
moralistic subcultures of Kansas and Nebraska are mitigated 
by elements of individualism that tend to pull them towards 
the latter. It will be observed also that the states in the 
Plains region are relatively more affluent and have higher 
voter turnout and higher welfare payments than do states in 
the Southeastern region.
However, a much more thorough and accurate analysis 
of the data is derived from the statistical results shown 
below. The hypotheses are restated and the results of the 
multiple regression and T-test performed are presented and 
discussed with reference to these hypotheses.
Null Hypothesis
Political subculture makes an insignificant impact on 
the welfare policies of the states in the Plains and
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Southeastern regions of the U.S. when compared to the impact 
made by wealth and political participation.
The above hypothesis is tested by finding out whether 
each of the independent variables accounts for a significant 
explanation of welfare when the remaining two independent 
variables are controlled. The test is carried out by 
calculating the F ratio for each of the variables for each 
year from the multiple regression analysis. Their levels of 
significance are compared and that of political culture is 
expected to be non-significant (null hypothesis).
Results 
Table-II
The Significance of Effects of Politial 
Participation, Wealth, and Political 
Culture on Welfare
(a) Controlling for Wealth and Political Culture
Year R2 (Total) 2R Change F P
1972 0. 818 0.019 1.57 Not Significant
1976 0. 861 0.002 0. 22 Not Significant
1980 0.939 0.002 0.05 Not Significant
(b) Controlling for Political Participation and 
Political Culture
1972 0. 818 0.055 4. 53 p < 0.05
1976 0. 861 0.059 6. 37 p < 0,01
1980 0.939 0.106 26.07 p < 0.01
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(c) Controlling for Political Participation and Wealth
1972 0. 818 0.060 4.95 P < 0.05
19 76 0. 861 0.086 9.28 P < 0.01
1980 0. 939 0.055 13.52 P < 0.01
Discussion
The null hypothesis is falsified. Wealth and political 
culture each make a significant independent impact upon 
welfare while political participation does not. This finding 
implies that even if political participation were omitted as 
an independent variable and a three-variable system or model 
were used instead of a four-variable system, probably the 
investigation would have suffered no serious loss, but not 
so with wealth and political culture. Perhaps the 
significant impact political participation is found to make 
on welfare in some studies could be explained by the fact 
that political culture is not used as one of the variables 
in these studies. With the introduction of political culture, 
which is believed to explain much of political participation, 
the latter shows no significant independent influence on 
welfare benefits.
Research Hypothesis 
The impact of political subculture on the content of 
welfare policies of the states in the Plains and Southeastern 
regions of the U.S. exceeds that of either wealth or political 
participation.
49
The step taken in testing this hypothesis consists 
of recording the standardized regression coefficients 
(beta weights) between wealth and political culture as 
independent variables while political participation is 
treated as a dependent variable (the indirect effects) 
and the beta weights between each individual variable and 
welfare (the direct effects). The effects coefficients 
(total effects) of the variables are computed and the total 
effects of political culture on welfare is expected to exceed 
that of either wealth or political participation on welfare.
Results 
Table III
The Indirect and Direct Effects of Wealth,
Culture, and Political Participation 
on Welfare
(a) Beta weights between wealth, and political culture as 
independent variables and political participation 
treated as a dependent variable— the indirect
effects
Year Variables Beta Weights
1972 Wealth 0.09
Political Culture 0.90
1976 Wealth 0.10
Political Culture 0.93
1980 Wealth 0.13
Political Culture 0.95
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(b) Beta weights between each individual independent 
variable and welfare— the direct effects
19 72 Wealth 0.25
Political Culture 0.53
Political Participation 0.29
1976 Wealth 0.28
Political Culture 0.69
Political Participation 0.09
1980 Wealth 0. 44
Political Culture 0.55
Political Participation 0.09
Discussion
The above results show that the research hypothesis is 
supported. An association of scores with the causal model 
and the calculation of the effects coefficients will make 
this fact more obvious.
For each of the three years, 19 72, 19 76, and 19 80, the 
total effects coefficients of political culture substantially 
exceeds those of wealth and political participation, those 
of political participation being the least except in 19 72 
when it equalled that of wealth. From these results, the 
writer concludes that political culture makes the greatest 
impact upon the welfare policies of the states in the Plains
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(1972)
0.90 0.09
0.29C
0.53 0.25
V
A
P = Political participation 
C = Political culture 
A = Welfare 
W = Wealth
Total effect of C on A = 0.53 +0.90 x 0.29 = 0.79 
Total effect of W on A = 0.25 +0.90 x .29 = 0.28 
Effect of P on A = 0.29
Figure 2. The Effects Coefficients of the Independent
Variables for 1972, 1976, and 1980.
(1976)
0.09C
0.69 0.28
*
A
P = Political participation 
C ~ Political culture 
A = Welfare 
W = Wealth
Total effect of C on A - 0.69 + 0.93 x 0.09 = 0.77
Total effect of W on A = 0.28 + 0.10 x 0.10 = 0.29
Total effect of P on A = 0.09
Figure 2 (continued). The Effects Coefficients of the
Independent Variables for 19 72, 19 76, and 19 80
(1980)
P
0.95
0.09C
0.55
P = Political participation 
C = Political culture 
A = Welfare 
W = Wealth
Total effect of C on A = 0.55 + 0.95 x 0.09 =
Total effect of W on A = 0.44 + 0.13 x 0.09 =
Total effect of P on A = 0.09
0.13
0.44
0. 64 
0. 45
Figure 2 (continued). The Effects Coefficients of the
Independent Variables for 19 72, 19 76, and 19 80
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and Southeastern regions of the U.S., followed by wealth, 
with political participation making a negligible impact.
It will be observed that the confirmation of the 
research hypothesis is consistent with Tompkins's finding 
based on path analysis, that ethnicity is more important 
in determining the amount paid as welfare benefits in the 
American states than wealth or political competition- 
participation.
Subsidiary Hypothesis 1 
The states that have moralistic (M) political 
subcultures will likely pay higher welfare benefits than 
states with traditionalistic (T) political subculture.
The comparative test which this hypothesis demands 
is verified by running a T-test of the two main political 
subcultures of the states under investigation against 
welfare for 1972, 1976, and 1980. The mean welfare payment 
of the political subcultures are compared. That of the 
moralistic subculture is expected to be greater than that of 
the traditionalistic subculture.
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Results 
Table IV
The Significance of Differences in Welfare 
Payments Between Moralistic and 
Traditionalistic States
Year Moralistic
Means
Traditionalistic T-Value DF P
1972 186.17 105.92 5. 38 17 < 0.0009
1976 232.50 126.38 5. 82 17 < 0.0009
1980 280.50 151.62 6. 43 17 < 0.0009
Discussion
The comparative test of the magnitude of welfare 
payments made by the states in the two political subcultures 
shows very significant results. The mean for the moralistic 
subculture for each of the three years far exceeds that of 
traditionalistic subculture, signifying that the states 
with moralistic subculture pay higher welfare benefits than 
the st&tes with traditionalistic subculture.
One may argue that the difference in the amount of 
welfare benefits paid by these two subcultures is explained 
by their difference in wealth instead. But the statistical 
results do not support this argument. When political culture 
and political participation are controlled, the influence 
of wealth on welfare is minimal compared to that of political 
culture on welfare when wealth and political participation are
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controlled. In 1972, wealth explained only about 25 percent 
of welfare policy variation whereas political culture 
explained about 75 percent of the variation. Besides, the 
test of the research hypothesis shows that political culture 
makes an impact on the welfare policies of the states under 
investigation that far exceeds that made by wealth. The 
writer maintains, therefore, that the amount of welfare 
benefits those states pay is contingent more upon their 
political culture than upon their wealth.
Subsidiary Hypothesis 2 
Political culture will likely have a greater impact 
on political participation than wealth will.
To test this hypothesis involves only a comparison 
of the beta weights between political culture and political 
participation and that between wealth and political 
participation. These beta weights have been obtained already 
in the previous tests.
57
Results 
Table V
The Comparative Influence of Political Culture 
and Wealth on Political Participation
Ye ar Political Culture - 
Political 
Participation
Wealth - 
Political 
Participation
1972 - 0.90 - 0.09
19 76 - 0.93 - 0.10
1980 - 0.95 - 0.13
Discussion
Comparing the beta weights between political culture 
and political participation on the one hand and wealth and 
political participation on the other, it becomes evident 
that the reciprocal influence between political culture and 
political participation is far greater than that between 
wealth and political participation. This result might stem 
from the naturally greater affinity political participation 
has for political culture than for wealth; political 
participation is more a part of political culture than 
wealth is.
CONCLUSION
Developing associations in pblicy studies has its
merits. But more important than these associations is
93developing and testing causal models. In the light of the
results of this study, grounds exist for questioning the
validity of studies that attribute the greatest environmental
influence on public policy to economic variables. It appears
that the elevation of economic variables in many of these
studies is as a result of their "failure to fully develop
94and test causal theories." But even some studies that 
employ improved methodologies have also concluded that 
economic factors influence public policy most. Michael 
Lewis-Beck using the path analytic technique concludes 
that:
When the effects coefficients for a common model of 
welfare policy are estimated in a data-based example, 
socioeconomic variables are found to be considerably 
more important than political v a r i a b l e s . 95
However, in his model, Lewis-Beck did not examine the
independent influence of political culture. Political
9 3Dye and Gray, p. 10.
94Ibid.
q 5 _ (
Michael S. Lewis-Beck, "The Relative Importance of 
Socioeconomic and Political Variables for Public Policy,"
The American Political Science Review 71 (June 1977) : 566.
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variables may not be very important in determining the content 
of welfare policy; even this study reveals only a low 
relationship between political participation and welfare 
policy. But another political variable— political culture—  
appears to be in a class by itself and my study, based on 
an improved methodology confirms its importance. Further 
study is still advisable in order to include more sophisticated 
measures of participation as well as other variables that 
might help explain policy.
The following conclusions could be drawn from this 
study: 1) political culture is more important than wealth
and political participation in determining the content of 
welfare policy in the states investigated; 2) wealth is 
important but its importance is secondary to that of 
political culture; 3) political participation as 
measured here seems unimportant. The implications of these 
conclusions suggest that one way to obtain more liberal 
public policies is to first work to change culture.
Attempts could be made to inject the more "other regarding" 
moralistic subculture into areas with individualistic 
subculture. A process of education and the mobilization 
of groups in the traditionalistic areas who might have 
moralistic tendency are lines of action that could be 
taken to effect the desired change.
But the process of cultural change, noted for its 
slowness, will not produce the quick results some of us
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might anticipate. Since culture does not yield easily to 
change, efforts to improve public policy content should also 
concentrate on the economic variable which is subject to 
government manipulation. Finally, realizing that 
cultural change takes time, perhaps generations, and that 
economic impacts are less effective, we need to exercise 
patience and accept those public policy changes that do come 
though they be smaller and slower than we might desire.
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APPENDIX A
Voter Turnout - Percentage of Age-Eligible 
Voters Who Voted in Presidential Elections
States in the Plains Region 1972 1976 1980 Political
Culture
1. Iowa 63.3 63.7 63.1 2.00
2. Kansas 59.0 58.4 57.2 3.66
3. Minnesota 68. 4 71. 4 70.6 1.00
4. Missouri 57.5 57. 7 59. 1 7.66
5.. 7'Nebraska 56.0 56.1 57. 1 3.66
6. North Dakota 67. 4 67.2 65.4 2.00
7. South Dakota 68.8 63. 8 67.6 3.00
States in the Southeastern Region
8. Alabama 43. 4 47.2 49.2 8.57
9. Arkansas 48.1 52.2 51.9 9. 00
10. Florida 49. 3 51.5 50.0 7. 80
11. Georgia 37.9 43. 3 41. 8 8. 80
12. Kentucky 48. 4 49.1 50.2 7. 40
13. Louisiana 44. 3 49. 8 53. 9 8.00
14. Mississippi 45. 0 49.5 52. 3 9. 00
15. North Carolina 43. 4 44.1 44.0 8. 50
16. South Carolina 38.6 41. 7 41.0 8. 75
17. Tennessee 43. 6 49.6 49. 1 8. 50
18. Virginia 45.5 47. 7 48.2 7. 86
19. West Virginia 62. 4 58. 1 53.1 7. 33
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APPENDIX B
Wealth - Per Capita Income in Constant 
(19 72) Dollars
States in the Plains Region 1972 1976 1980 Political
Culture
Iowa 3,476 4, 874 5,232 2.00
Kansas 3,681 4,917 5,580 3.66
Minnesota 3,666 4,658 5,436 1.00
Missouri 3,564 4,546 5,021 7.66
Nebraska 3,411 4,724 5,234 3.66
North Dakota 3,118 4,088 4,891 2.00
South Dakota 2,949 3,631 4, 362 3.00
States in the Southeastern Region
Alabama 2,963 3,864 4,186 8. 57
Arkansas 2,685 3, 840 4,062 9. 00
Florida 3,885 4,624 5,028 7. 80
Georgia 3, 380 4,217 4,512 8. 80
Kentucky 3,025 4,105 4,255 7. 40
Louisiana 2,876 4,077 4, 727 8. 00
Mississippi 2,497 3,463 3,677 9. 00
North Carolina 3,196 4,095 4,371 8. 50
South Carolina 2,925 3, 880 4,061 8. 75
Tennessee 3,099 4,112 4,315 8. 50
Virginia 3, 883 4,751 5,250 7. 86
West Virginia 2,962 4,083 4, 360 7. 33
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APPENDIX C
Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) 
Average Monthly Payment Per Family in Dollars
States in the Plains Region 19 72 19 76 19 80 Political
Culture
Iowa 188 260 307 2.00
Kansas 19 3 226 271 3.66
Minnesota 234 264 336 1.00
Missouri 105 140 217 7. 66
Nebraska 149 204 274 3.66
North Dakota 185 238 277 2.00
South Dakota 168 203 218 3.00
States in the Southeastern Region
Alabama 75 103 110 8.57
Arkansas 112 122 145 9.00
Florida 97 12 7 175 7. 80
Georgia 100 96 133 8. 80
Kentucky 120 174 176 7. 40
Louisiana 91 121 147 8.00
Mississippi 53 48 88 9.00
North Carolina 114 155 16 4 8.50
South Carolina 81 86 10 7 8. 75
Tennessee 104 104 113 8.50
Virginia 168 192 214 7. 86
West Virginia 157 175 182 7. 33
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APPENDIX D
Political Culture Score of 4 8 U.S. States 
as Modified by Sharkansky*
State Score State Score
Alabama ;8. 57 Nebraska 3.66
Arizona 5.66 Nevada 3.00
Arkansas 9. 00 New Hampshire 2.33
California 3. 55 New Jersey 4.00
Colorado 1. 80 Nex Mexico 7.00
Connecticut 3. 00 New York 3.62
Delaware 7. 00 North Carolina 8. 50
Florida 7. 80 North Dakota 2.00
Georgia 8. 80 Ohio 5.16
Idaho 2. 50 Oklahoma 8. 25
Illinois 4. 72 Oregon 2.00
Indiana 6. 33 Pennsylvania 4.28
Iowa 2. 00 Rhode Island 3.00
Kansas 3. 66 South Carolina 8. 75
Kentucky 7. 40 South Dakota 3.00
Louisiana 8.00 Tennessee 8.50
Maine 2. 33 Texas 7. 11
Maryland 7. 00 Utah 2.00
Massachusetts 3.66 Vermont 2. 33
Michigan 2.00 Virginia 7. 86
Minnesota 1.00 Washington 1.66
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APPENDIX D (continued)
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Political Culture Score of 48 U.S. States 
as Modified by Sharkansky*
State Score State Score
Mississippi 9.00 West Virginia 7. 33
Missouri 7.66 Wisconsin 2.00
Montana 3.00 Wyoming 4.00
*Ira Sharkansky, "The Utility of Elazar’s Political Culture: 
A Research Note," p. 72.
